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CASE COMMENTS
ADVANCE PAYMENTS AND THE ACCRUAL TAXPAYER
General rules for the methods of accounting to be used in comput-
ing taxable income are provided under section 446 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. "Taxable income shall be computed under
the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly
computes his income in keeping his books."' Both the accrual method
and the cash basis method are specifically listed as acceptable, pro-
vided the method used clearly reflects income. The rules seem clear
enough; but when an accrual basis taxpayer receives income before
it is earned, that is, before it is accrued in the accounting sense, courts
have been faced with the problem of whether it is immediately in-
cludable in taxable income or whether its taxability can be deferred.
The problem has arisen mainly in the "services to be performed"
cases.
2
Recently, in Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc.,3 the same problem
arose in a different context. Hagen manufactures dealer-identification
signs for national advertisers, who place blanket purchase orders of
signs for later delivery to specific dealers as released by the purchaser.
Hagen begins the manufacturing process when it receives orders,
normally being in a position to start delivery of signs in about four
weeks. A sign is not delivered until release orders are received from
it customers specifying the dealer to whom a sign is to be shipped.
At the end of a tax year Hagen has on hand signs in various stages
of completion. Advance payments are received in two situations. One
situation arises when a blanket order has been outstanding for an
extended period of time, usually over twelve months, in which case
Hagen may bill the customer to induce a release. The other arises
when customers, on their own initiative, request a billing in advance
of delivery. Hagen records such advance payments as a liability under
accounts designated "advances from customers" but uses the funds
without restriction.
Hagen keeps its books and reports its income on an accrual basis.
It does not include in income such advances received from customers
until actual delivery, at which time it recognizes the amounts as earned,
crediting the sales account and making a corresponding adjustment
in the "advances from customers" account.
1INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446.
'These cases involve reserves set up out of advance receipts which correspond to
some service to be performed at a date beyond the taxable year.
347 T.C. No. 13 (Nov. 18, 1966).
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Hagen determines its cost of goods sold by the use of inventories,
following in this regard section 1.471-1 of the Income Tax Regula-
tions, which provides:
In order to reflect taxable income correctly, inventories at the
beginning and end of each taxable year are necessaiy in every
case in which the production, purchase, or sale of merchandise
is an income-producing factor. The inventory should include
all finished or partly finished goods .... Merchandise should
be included in the inventory only if title thereto is vested in the
taxpayer. Accordingly, the seller should include in his inventory
goods under contract for sale but not yet segregated and applied
to the contract .... A purchaser... should not include goods
ordered for future delivery, transfer of title to which has not
yet been effected.
4
Pursuant to this regulation, Hagen included undelivered signs in
closing inventory and so excluded from the year's cost of goods sold 5
costs incurred in the production of signs which had not yet been
delivered but for which advance payments had been received.
The Commissioner rejected this treatment of advance payments
and required inclusion of such advances as income in the year of actual
receipt. No adjustment was made in the handling of inventories. The
Tax Court, two judges dissenting, sustained the Commissioner's
determination.
Under the accrual system of accounting items are includable in
income when "earned," whether received before or after that time.0
Expenses, or expired costs in the accounting sense, are recognized at
the same time. Recognition of income as "earned" in the accounting
sense usually comes upon the transfer of assets or upon the performance
of a service. It is the consumation of the sale accompanied by a cor-
responding reduction in liability that is the key.7 In the majority
of instances involving a sale of goods accountants treat income as
earned upon delivery of the goods. However, there is an exception:
when goods are ordered to specification the manufacturer may elect
to treat income as earned upon completion of the goods.8 This election
was available to Hagen but it chose to follow the more common
procedure of treating income as earned upon delivery. It is important
'TREAs. REG. § 1471-1 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
'Cost of goods sold equals beginning inventory plus manufacturing costs, minus
ending inventory.
6
See generally AMORY 9- HARDEE, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING 89 (3 d ed. 1959);
KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING 43 (1954); SHUGARMAN, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS
152 (1952)-
7KATz, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING § 38 (1954).
8See PATON, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 453 (1941).
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to note that Hagen followed this method consistently. "For most
types of business, a satisfactory determination of periodic income in-
volves the accounting techniques of accrual and deferment. Without
the use of these techniques, the recognition of revenue and expense...
would result in an 'income' amount of little significance." 9 The goal
behind accrual and deferral techniques is a clear reflection of income.10
Over the past thirty years the Internal Revenue Service has sought
to persuade the courts that the accountants' method of handling ad-
vance receipts of the accrual basis taxpayer should not be followed
as a matter of federal income tax law. Yet, the language of the federal
income tax statutes do not seem to require a method different from
that used as a matter of sound accounting practice. As one com-
mentator has said:
An examination of the revenue acts and their legislative
history would seem to establish an adequate basis for the pro-
position that the method of handling prepaid income advocated
by the accounting profession was the method provided for and
intended."
Section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specifically requires
the use of the same accounting method for tax purposes as is used in
keeping one's books as long as this method clearly reflects income.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner seems to have consistently disallowed
the deferral of advance receipts, unless some restriction is placed on
the use of the money. The Tax Court has been consistently persuaded
by the Commissioner's arguments.
While recognizing the accrual method as an acceptable one and
while even going so far as to recognize deferral of prepaid income as
a part of this method, the early cases disallowed deferral for other
reasons. 1
2
In 1932 the United State Supreme Court developed a "claim of
right" doctrine in North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet.13 The case
OKATz, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING § 37, at 43 (1954).
"°See AMORY 9= HARDEE, MATERIALS ON AcCOUNTING 89 (3 d ed. 1959).
uRothaus, A Critical Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Prepaid Income, 17 MD.
L. REv. 121 (1957). The Revenue Act of 1913 was based wholly on the cash receipts
method of accounting, while the later act of 1916 provided for use of the accrual
method. The Revenue Act of 1918 continued to recognize the accrual method but
made it mandatory to compute income on the basis on which books were kept.
Rothaus, supra at 122.
"'E.g., Jennings & Co. v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 32 (gth Cir. 1932); United States
v. Boston & P.R.R., 37 F.2d. 670 (1st Cir. 193o); Creasey Corp. v. Helburn, 57 F.2d
204 (V.D. Ky., 1932); Bradstreet Co., 23 B.T.A. 1093 (1931); Automobile Under-
writers, Inc., 19 B.T.A. 116o (1930); O'Day Inv. Co., i$ B.T.A. 1230 (1928).
n286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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involved an item which was admittedly net income but the right to
which was being contested. The Court said that the amount was
income and that its taxability as such could not hinge on the outcome
of the pending suit. It was sufficient that the amount was held under
a "claim of right." The case had nothing to do with deferral of
advance receipts14 but the Tax Court soon extended the doctrine to
include this problem.
Beginning with Beacon Publishing Co.15 "the Commissioner
dredged up the 'claim of right' doctrine, persuaded the Tax Court to
apply it to a situation for which it was not designed... and from then
on nearly all the Tax Court decisions relied on 'claim of right.'"16
The petitioner in Hagen, therefore, faced a long line of Tax Court
decisions against deferral of advance receipts in the "services to be
performed" cases.17
Unfortunately, for purposes of analysis, the transactions in Hagen
giving rise to the tax problem involved a spectrum of transactions
rather than a single, well-defined type. Advance payments were re-
ceived both as the result of Hagen's billings and of the customers'
initiative for their own convenience. Furthermore, the signs involved
were in all stages of completion.
Viewed as a case involving advance payments for signs only
partially constructed so that substantial costs were yet to be incurred,
a strong case for deferral of income reporting can be made. Viewed
solely as a case involving advance payments for completed signs, for
which all costs, except those involved in making delivery, have been
incurred, the case for deferral is weaker.
When the transactions are interpreted as presenting the strongest
case for deferral, the situation presented is essentially the same as
in the "services to be performed" cases, there being substantial costs
yet to be incurred. As so viewed, the Commissioner's argument basic-
ally turns out to be the "claim of right" doctrine. The majority said:
"Brown v. Helvering, 291 US. 193 (1934), is consistently cited as the case in
which the claim of right doctrine was applied to deferral of advanced receipts.
However, the case contained two issues and the doctrine was not applied to the ad-
vance receipts issue.
121 T.C. 6io (1954), rev'd, 218 F.2d 697 (ioth Cir. 1955).
'0 Costigan, Accrual Accounting in the Court of Appeals, 38 TAXES 339, 342
(1960).
'Must taxpayers score a grand slam before the Commissioner and the Tax
Court give up? "[T]he courts of appeals for seven different circuits, (Second
Circuit, Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Ninth Circuit,
and Tenth Circuit) have reversed the Tax Court in this area." Costigan, supra at
339, 342-
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The advance payments received by petitioner from its customers
were without restriction as to use or disposition and were in
fact used by petitioner in its normal business operations....
Insofar as this record shows, under no circumstances would
petitioner be required to return any portion of the advance
payments.... s
In support of its holding on this point, the Tax Court cited Auto-
mobile Club of New York, Inc.19 In that case the Tax Court also
relied on "the claim of right" doctrine without so labeling it.20 It is
significant to note the similarity in the words used.
[W]here there is actual receipt and the funds are at the un-
restricted disposal of the taxpayer, as is the case here, all the
events have already occurred which call for accrual. 2'
This argument would seem to hold little weight in light of the
fact that in two recent deferral cases decided by the Supreme Court
Schlude v. Commissioner22 and AAA v. United States,23 the Court
finally rejected the claim of right approach as inapplicable. AAA
involved a service organization which deferred membership dues to
related periods of service based on their overall cost experience. The
Court said "as four circuits have correctly held, the claim of right
doctrine furnishes no support for the Government's position."24 The
Government shifted its argument to the position that incomes and
expenses could not be deferred so as to reflect the long-term result
of a particular transaction. The Court also found this argument
inapplicable. Schlude involved a dance studio which deferred pay-
ments for dance lessons until the period in which the lessons were
actually taught. The dissent said:
Apparently the Court agrees that neither the annual account-
ing requirement nor the claim-of-right doctrine has any rele-
vance or applicability to the question involved in this case.
For the Court does not base its decision on either theory, but
rather, as in two previous cases, upon the ground that the
system of accrual accounting used by these particular taxpayers
does not 'clearly reflect income'....2o
"47 T.C. No. 13, at io3.
'D 32 T.C. 9o6 (1959).
mThe dissent suggests that the decision is "an application of the so-called
'claim of right' doctrine to the accrual method of accounting-although it was not
here, as it was in several of the cited cases, so labeled." Automobile Club of New
York, Inc., 32 T.C. 9o6, 919 (1959).
"Automobile Club of New York, Inc., 32 T.C. 9o6, 913 (1959).
2372 U.S. 128 (1963).
"367 U.S. 687 (1961).
!AId. at 7oo.
5372 U.S. 128, 139 (1963) (Footnotes omitted.)
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The decisions in these cases indicate that the Court does not want
to place a final stamp of validity or invalidity on the deferral of pre-
paid income. Instead it disallowed deferral based on artificiality in
the method of correlating advance payments and future costs.2 0
Both Schlude and AAA relied on Automobile Club of Michigan,
Inc. 27 in holding that the taxpayer's method of deferral was artificial
and did not clearly reflect income. In disallowing deferral on this
basis, the Court in Automobile Club of Michigan, Inc. indicated that
a more specific determination would be acceptable. Such determina-
tions have been held acceptable in a number of cases.
Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,2s decided by the Tenth
Circuit the year before Automobile Club of Michigan, Inc. held that
in the case of prepaid newspaper subscriptions such a realistic de-
ferral was acceptable. Congress has since given statutory recognition
to these deferrals in section 455 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Cases since Beacon have allowed realistic deferrals in other
types of "services to be performed" cases. Schuessler v. Commissioner2 9
involved a reserve set up by a furnace dealer to offset the cost of
future maintenance service which he was required to perform under
contracts of sale. The reserve was allowed, on the principles of Beacon,
as clearly reflecting income. In Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissionero
the taxpayer was in the business of selling radios. To induce sales
Bressner entered into twelve-month repair contracts with each sale.
A portion of the amount received from each sale was set aside to
cover possible future obligations under the contracts. In reporting
income, it did not include such amounts as earned when received but
rather pro-rated the same over the life of the contract, resulting in
the amounts being included in income in subsequent years. The
Second Circuit sustained the taxpayer's treatment. Automobile Club
of Michigan, Inc. which it distinguished, the court said:
2The court also based its decision on the fact that Congress repealed sections
452 and 462 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which gave statutory sanction
to such deferrals. This argument seems invalid in light of the fact that "the
Secretary of the Treasury, who proposed the repeal of these sections made explicitly
clear that no inference of disapproval of accrual accounting principles was to be
drawn from the repeal of the sections. So did the Senate Report. The repeal of
these sections was occasioned soley by the fear of temporary revenue losses which
would result from the taking of 'double deductions' during the year of transition
by taxpayers who had not previously maintained their books on an accrual basis."
372 U.S. 128, 140 (1963) (Footnotes omitted.)
353 U.S. 18o (1956).
212 18 F.2d 697 (loth Cir. 1955).
2923o F.2d 722 (5 th Cir. 1956).
3°267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
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It is apparent from the decision of the majority that at least
for purposes of the decision of the case it assumed that realistic
deferral would have been permissible, and found only that
no realistic deferral was made.3'
In Beacon, Schuessler and Automobile Club of Michigan, the
amount of prepaid income deferred was held realistic if it "bore a
carefully estimated relationship to the services petitioner would be
called upon to render."3 2 The estimates were based on past cost
experience in providing such a service. In other words deferral was
allowed if it bore a realistic relationship to estimated future expenses
and, thus, clearly reflected income.
However, these cases involved the performance of services and
not the manufacture of goods, and so the accounting technique used
was different from that used by Hagen. Hagen involves the use of
inventories.
The majority in Hagen recognized that section 1.471-1 of the
Income Tax Regulation provides for the use of inventories wherever
production of merchandise is an income-producing factor. It also
recognized that only items to which title is vested in the taxpayer
should be included in inventory.33 The majority further pointed out
that it was not in issue whether Hagen could have done something to
the signs so that title would have passed to the customers. "Petitioner,
as the facts show, did not do this. '3 4
On the other hand, the dissent said:
While it might be argued that this problem could be over-
come by excluding from year-end inventories (and including in
cost of goods sold) the costs allocable to goods on hand (finished
or in process) for which advance payment has been received,
such adjustments would be contrary to sec. 1.471-1, Income
Tax Regs, would force manufacturers to adopt burdensome
and costly job-cost accounting systems, and would produce
such a breakdown of fundamental principles of cost of goods
sold accounting as would virtually nullify the integrity of any
accounting system .... 35
The dissent approaches the problem from the "cost end." Since
MWd. at 526.
1id. at 529.
-"Section 471 of the Code and section 1.471-1 of the Commissioner's regulations
deal with what items are generally included in inventory. These regulations provide
for inclusion in inventory only of items to which title is vested in the taxpayer...."
47 T.C. No. 13, at 1o4.
'47 T.C. No. 13, at 1o4. If Hagen did not so set apart the signs to have title
pass, title necessarily must remain in him.
347 T.C. No. 13, at nii n.4 .
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Hagen's method of handling inventories, which deferred recognition
of expenses, is in accord with the Treasury Regulation, the taxpayer
should likewise be entitled to defer recognition of income to secure
a matching of income and expenses in the same year. As to uncom-
pleted signs, for which substantial costs are yet to be incurred, it
would seem that Hagen presents a strong case for deferral in light
of the Beacon-Schuessler-Autornobile Club of Michigan, Inc. line of
cases and the analysis of the dissent.
On the other hand, the majority approaches the problem from
the "revenue end." Since Hagen has received payments for its un-
restricted use, it could recognize income as earned at that time. Under
the accrual system of accounting it would have to recognize expenses
at the same time. Whether or not it could do so, according to the
majority, was not an issue in the case so the question was left un-
resolved. In light of this approach the case for deferral, viewed only
as to completed signs, appears weaker. The majority pointed out
that under section 446 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the
Commissioner has the right to require a change in accounting method
if he thinks income is not being clearly reflected. Requiring advance
receipts to be treated as earned in the year of receipt would be an
acceptable accounting procedure as to signs completed in that year.
As shown earlier this would qualify as the exception to the accrual
accounting procedure of treating income as earned on delivery.
The error in Hagen, apparently overlooked by the majority, is
that requiring such a change in accounting method only as to com-
pleted signs results in an inconsistency in accounting methods which
is clearly unsound.36 Requiring Hagen to treat income as earned upon
completion of a sign as to signs for which advances have been received,
while allowing it to treat income as earned upon delivery of a sign
as to signs for which advances have not been received is clearly
inconsistent.
Consequently, in light of the wide range of transactions involved
in Hagen, the case can serve as a springboard for arguing, as the
judges of the Tax Court did, more than one position. The United
States Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held
that realistic deferrals of advance payments must be permitted under
3Consistency is one of the most fundamental principles of accounting.
"Wherever two or more methods ... are permitted by custom or convention, the
principle of consistency requires that one of these methods be adopted and used
consistently." OEHLER, LAwYER'S ACCOUNTING HANDBOOK 41 (1952). See FINNEY &
MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 144 (6th ed. 1965).
